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This paper estimates the effect on participation rates of families of various types of replacing 
HUD’s largest low-income housing programs with alternative tenure-neutral entitlement housing 
voucher programs that differ in their taxpayer cost and the relative generosity of the subsidy to 
households of different types.  The estimates of participation in the entitlement programs are 
based primarily on the five-percent household sample from the 2000 Decennial Census and 
participation experience in the only entitlement housing assistance programs that have been 
operated in the United States.  HUD’s administrative records provide data on current recipients 
of low-income housing assistance.  The paper explores the sensitivity of the results to the 
equations used to predict participation.  The results indicate that even the entitlement housing 
voucher program that costs 10 percent less than the current system would serve 50 percent more 
households in total and many more of each type – white, black, and Hispanic; elderly and 
nonelderly; families living in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas; small, medium, and large 
families; and households in the first two real income deciles. 
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The Effect on Program Participation of Replacing Current Low-Income Housing Programs 
with an Entitlement Housing Voucher Program 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Low-income housing assistance is a major part of the U.S. welfare system.  Unlike other major 
means-tested transfer programs, no low-income housing program is an entitlement for any type 
of household.  Nevertheless, federal, state, and local governments spend substantially more on 
housing subsidies to the poor than on other better-known parts of the welfare system such as 
TANF.  The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development spent more than $36 billion in 
FY 2009, federal tax expenditures on the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, mortgage revenue 
bonds, and multi-family revenue bonds added more than $5 billion, the USDA’s low-income 
housing programs cost almost $1 billion, and state and local governments spend some money 
from their own resources to provide such assistance.  For example, local governments provide 
substantial property tax abatements to all public housing projects and many privately owned 
projects. 
Plausible assumptions about taxpayer preferences argue strongly for replacing the current 
patchwork of non-entitlement low-income housing programs with an entitlement housing 
assistance program for the poorest households [Olsen, 2003, pp. 428-430].  The non-entitlement 
nature of housing assistance is a historical accident.
1
                                                 
1 Government involvement began during the Great Depression with a program that subsidized the construction of 
public housing projects.  In part, this program was intended to increase employment.  The number of households 
made eligible for public housing enormously exceeded the ability to build apartments for them. 
  Offering some households large subsidies 
while denying assistance to other identical households cannot be defended.  Evidence on the 
excessive costs of all forms of unit-based housing assistance argues for exclusive reliance on 
tenant-based assistance [Olsen, 2003, pp. 394-399; Olsen, 2008, pp. 9-15; Olsen, 2009].  It costs 
much more to provide equally good housing with unit-based housing assistance, and unit-based 
assistance has no offsetting advantages.  Therefore, it would be possible to serve current 
recipients equally well (that is, provide them with equally good housing for the same rent) and 
serve many additional families without spending more money by shifting resources from unit-
based to tenant-based assistance.  The results of the best study of HUD’s largest program that   2 
subsidized the construction of privately-owned projects imply that tenant-based vouchers could 
have provided all of the families who participated in the Section 8 New Construction Program 
with equally good housing for the same rent and served at least 72 percent more families with 
similar characteristics equally well without any additional public expenditure [Wallace et al., 
1981].  Finally, few argue that the government should actively discourage homeownership by 
low-income households.  Low-income housing assistance should be at worst neutral in this 
regard.  Recent events say more about how, rather than whether, to deliver homeownership 
assistance to low-income households. 
The current situation differs greatly from the ideal of an entitlement program of tenant-
based housing assistance that does not discourage homeownership.  Less than 30 percent of 
eligible renters receive low-income housing assistance, and this percentage is much lower for 
eligible homeowners [Olsen, 2003, pp. 390-393].  This is not because they do not want it on the 
terms offered.  There are long waiting lists to get into subsidized housing in all localities, and the 
length of the waiting list understates excess demand in many localities because housing 
authorities often close their waiting lists when they get sufficiently long.  Furthermore, more than 
two thirds of low-income housing assistance is unit-based.  Finally, the current system of low-
income housing assistance is heavily biased against homeownership.  After accounting for 
geographical price differences and adding an imputed return on home equity to the income of 
homeowners in calculating real income, nearly 25 percent of renters but less than 5 percent of 
homeowners in the lowest real income decile receive housing assistance.  The gap is smaller in 
the second real income decile, but still substantial [Olsen, 2007, Table 1].  The federal 
government does provide large subsidies through the federal income tax system that induce more 
households to be homeowners and homeowners to occupy better housing.  However, the bulk of 
these subsidies go to middle- and upper-income families. 
Replacing the current system of low-income housing programs with an entitlement 
program of tenant-based assistance has been espoused by housing policy analysts for many years 
[Khadduri and Struyk (1982), Olsen (1982), Weicher (1997), and Olsen (2004)].  The Clinton 
Administration proposed comprehensive legislation for phasing out unit-based assistance [HUD, 
1995], and in his campaign against President Clinton, Robert Dole also proposed vouchering out 
public housing.  Although the Clinton proposals were not adopted, the 1998 Housing Act   3 
mandated the demolition of public housing projects and the provision of tenant-based assistance 
to their residents under certain circumstances and allowed it under other circumstances. 
This paper studies the effect on participation rates of families of various types of 
replacing HUD’s current low-income housing programs with alternative tenure-neutral 
entitlement housing voucher programs.  Some have the same taxpayer cost as the current system, 
others cost 10 percent more, and still others 10 percent less.  Several alternative adjustments of 
the subsidy for family size and composition are considered as well as higher subsidies for 
households with an elderly or disabled head.  Finally, the paper explores the sensitivity of the 
results to the equations used to predict participation. 
The entitlement voucher programs analyzed would offer a cash grant to each eligible 
family on the condition that it occupy housing meeting certain standards.  This type of housing 
voucher was used in HUD’s entitlement Housing Assistance Supply Experiment (HASE) 
operated in two metropolitan areas in the 1970s and in a non-entitlement national voucher 
program administered by HUD from 1983 through 1999.  The minimum housing standards are 
similar to those in HUD’s current voucher program.  Like most current HUD programs, the 
entitlement voucher programs considered reduce the subsidy by 30 cents for each additional 
dollar of adjusted income.  They also mimic the income adjustments in current programs.  Unlike 
the current voucher program, the proposed programs are neutral with respect to homeownership 
(that is, a household receives the same subsidy with the same restrictions whether it owns or 
rents its dwelling unit).  They also involve different subsidy levels than the current voucher 
program in order to achieve specified taxpayer costs. 
Due to the absence of relevant data on the characteristics of households served by the 
majority of occupants of Low Income Housing Tax Credit projects, USDA’s housing programs, 
HUD’s HOME and CDBG block grants, and HUD’s programs for the homeless, the analysis will 
be limited to replacing HUD’s other programs with an entitlement voucher program.  That is, 
this paper analyzes effects of replacing public housing, the tenant-based and project-based 
Section 8 programs, and HUD’s older programs that subsidize privately owned projects.  Since 
HUD provides project-based or tenant-based Section 8 subsidies on behalf of a substantial 
minority of the tenants of tax credit projects and HUD routinely collects data on these 
households, they are included in the analysis.  The overwhelming majority of other households in 
tax credit projects have incomes too high to be eligible for the entitlement programs analyzed.    4 
We assume that these households and households served by other programs excluded from the 
analysis will continue to be served by their current programs.  Since the proposed reforms would 
not reduce the development subsidies associated with tax credit projects, these projects would 
continue to serve the same number of households.  As in HASE, voucher recipients would not be 
allowed to live in subsidized housing projects.  Therefore, the poorest households in tax credit 
projects would be replaced gradually by households with higher incomes. 
The estimates of participation in the entitlement housing voucher programs are based on 
the five-percent household sample from the 2000 Decennial Census and previously estimated 
regression equations explaining participation in the entitlement housing assistance programs 
operated during the 1970s in two metropolitan areas as a part of the Experimental Housing 
Allowance Program’s Housing Assistance Supply Experiment.  These two experimental 
programs are the only entitlement low-income housing programs that have been operated in the 
United States.  The two sites were chosen to differ greatly with respect to their vacancy rate and 
racial composition.  The Supply Experiment entitlement housing assistance programs were 
neutral with respect to homeownership, and they provided a subsidy equal to a payment standard 
minus 25 percent of adjusted income on the condition that the household occupy a dwelling 
meeting certain minimum housing standards.  To predict participation rates based on HASE 
experience, we adjust 1999 nominal magnitudes for differences in prices across space and time.  
HUD administrative data are used to determine participation rates of different types of 
households under its current programs. 
In assessing the political feasibility of the type of fundamental reform considered in this 
paper, it is important to realize that this reform need not be implemented overnight.  A politically 
feasible reform would involve a transition that does not harm, or even benefits, the 
overwhelming majority of current recipients of low-income housing assistance.  For example, 
public housing tenants could be offered a choice between housing vouchers and staying in their 
current units on the same terms.  This will benefit some without hurting others.  Current 
recipients of Section 8 vouchers could be allowed to receive the generous subsidies that are now 
offered by the program while new recipients receive less generous subsidies so that more 
households can be served.  Reform must also honor legal commitments.  For example, payments 
on current terms will be provided to owners of private subsidized projects until the end of their 
use agreements.  Occupants of these projects will not be offered vouchers until that time, and   5 





2.  Entitlement Housing Voucher Programs 
 
This section specifies the parameters common to the entitlement housing voucher programs 
analyzed.  Because these programs have the same structure and some of the same parameters as 
the program operated in HASE and participation predictions are based on HASE experience, we 
begin with a few additional details about the Experiment.   
Congress authorized the Experimental Housing Allowance Program in 1970, planning for 
the experiment occurred in the early 1970s, data were collected during the mid-1970s, and the 
final reports were completed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The Rand Corporation conducted 
the Housing Assistance Supply Experiment.
3
Figure 1 depicts the budget space of a household offered this type of housing assistance 
under standard simplifying assumptions.  The quantity of housing services 
  This experiment involved operating entitlement 
housing allowance programs in the Green Bay and the South Bend metropolitan areas.  At the 
time of the experiment, Green Bay had few minorities and a rental vacancy rate of about 5 
percent.  South Bend had a large minority population and a rental vacancy rate of about 10 
percent.  About 16.5 percent of the households in Green Bay and 21.4 percent in South Bend 
were eligible for the entitlement program [Lowry, 1983, p. 90].  In the entitlement voucher 
programs considered in this paper, the fraction eligible ranges from 14.5 to 16.3 percent.  Unlike 
established housing programs, both renters and homeowners could participate.  These 
households were offered a cash grant on the condition that they occupy housing meeting certain 
standards.  These payments could continue for up to ten years provided that the household’s 
income remained sufficiently low.  Unlike the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, the 
payments were made directly to the households.  Empirical evidence indicates that the cost-
effectiveness of the voucher program does not depend to any significant extent on this feature 
[Mayo et al. (1980); Wallace et al., 1981; Weinberg, 1982; Leger and Kennedy, 1990; 
ORC/Macro, 2001, Chapter V]. 
H Q  is measured along 
                                                 
2 Olsen (2008, pp. 17-23) provides detailed proposals for the transition to an entitlement housing voucher program. 
3 Lowry (1983) describes the Supply Experiment and its main findings.   6 
the horizontal axis, the quantity of other goods  X Q  along the vertical axis.  The quantity of 
housing services is an index of the overall desirability of the dwelling unit and its neighborhood.  
If the household were to decline the offer of housing assistance, it could consume any bundle of 
goods that costs no more than its income Y at market prices  H P  and  X P .  These are the points on 
or below the line segment AB.  Under the voucher program in the Supply Experiment, the 
household receives a subsidy S  on the condition it occupies a unit meeting the program’s 
minimum housing standards (in the diagram, a unit that provides at least 
MIN
H Q  units of housing 
service).  The shaded area in Figure 1 is the budget space of a household that is offered this type 
of voucher.  The subsidy in the Supply Experiment was equal to a payment standard R minus 25 
percent of the family’s adjusted income.  Larger families were entitled to subsidies based on 
larger payment standards to enable them to occupy units with more bedrooms.   
Because participation in an entitlement housing program depends in part on the 
program’s minimum housing standards and our participation predictions are based on 
participation in HASE, the proposed programs adopt the minimum housing standards that were 
used in the Supply Experiment.  These minimum housing standards are very similar to the 
standards in the current Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program [Katagiri and Kingsley, 
1980, Section 2.07; 24CFR982.401]. 
The subsidy to a household under each entitlement housing program analyzed is equal to 
a payment standard minus 30 percent of the household’s adjusted income provided that this 
amount exceeds $30 a month.
4
                                                 
4 This subsidy formula differs from that in the current voucher program in several respects.  Under the proposed 
programs, the subsidy does not depend on the rent of the unit occupied.  Under the current voucher program, 
occupying a unit renting for less than the program’s payment standard reduces the subsidy dollar for dollar and (on 
new leases) occupying one renting for more than the payment standard plus 10 percent of adjusted income reduces 
the subsidy to zero [Olsen, 2003, pp. 401-404].   
  Like other welfare programs, we set a lower bound on the 
subsidy to avoid the administrative cost of distributing a small amount of money.  Like payment 
standards in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, the payment standards within an 
area for each program analyzed are different for households of different sizes and compositions, 
and they are different across areas for households of a given size and composition.  However, 
they are not the payment standards in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program.  Payment 
standards in the each entitlement voucher program analyzed are designed to achieve a specified   7 
taxpayer cost and insure that households with the same characteristics are able to occupy equally 
good housing in all localities. 
Like the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, we establish payment standards 
that are tied to an entitlement to a unit with a particular number of bedrooms.  However, families 
are not required to live in a unit with the specified number of bedrooms.  Like the current 
program, the bedroom entitlement is only used to determine the payment standard and hence the 
generosity of the subsidy.  Although federal rules do not mandate a particular number of 
bedrooms for households of a given size and composition, the norm under the current system is 
two people to a bedroom with certain exceptions [HUD, 2001, Section 5.9; HUD, 2003, Chapter 
5].  For example, virtually all housing authorities establish a relationship that depends on the mix 
of age and gender of the children.  Our payment standards assume two persons to a bedroom 
except to avoid the sharing of a bedroom by children of the opposite sex who are over six years 
old and adults who are not married or partners.  Boys and girls under seven of different sexes can 
share a bedroom.  Two children of the same sex can share a bedroom no matter what their ages.  
Our data do not indicate the relationship between adults except their relationship to the 
household head who filled out the Census questionnaire.  Therefore, we allocate a separate 
bedroom to each other adult who was neither the spouse nor unmarried partner of the respondent.  
Although some households surely contain more than one couple, this is rare.  Less than 5 percent 
of all households have more than three adults, and some of these households surely have only 
one couple.   
Unlike the current Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, we establish a nationally 
uniform relationship between the payment standards for units with different numbers of 
bedrooms.  In the current program, each local housing authority can choose a payment standard 
for units with a particular number of bedrooms within 10 percent of HUD’s Fair Market Rent 
(FMR) that applies throughout its metropolitan area or non-metropolitan county.  Furthermore, 
relative FMRs for units with different numbers of bedrooms are not the same across all areas.  
Current ratios in a locality are based on local differences in median rents of units with different 
numbers of bedrooms, with some fairly arbitrary upward adjustments for units with more than 
two bedrooms.  The methods used to produce FMRs and housing authority discretion in setting 
payment standards based on them lead to deviations in the relative payment standards for units 
with different numbers of bedrooms across housing authorities.   8 
We analyze two alternative nationally uniform relationships between the payment 
standards for units with different numbers of bedrooms.  One is based on the percentage 
difference in 2006 national average FMR for units with each number of bedrooms up to 4, with a 
15 percent increment for each additional bedroom beyond 4.
5
Under each alternative entitlement housing voucher program, payment standards across 
areas are adjusted fully for differences in housing prices.  This enables households entitled to the 
same number of bedrooms and living in units renting for the local payment standard to occupy 
equally good housing in all localities.  Olsen, Davis, and Carrillo (2005, pp. 9-11) describe the 
derivation of this price index.
  The other is based on the 
coefficients of a hedonic equation explaining the natural logarithm of the market rents of 
dwelling units as a function of many housing and neighborhood characteristics, dummy variables 
for the location of the unit in one of 331 metropolitan areas or the non-metropolitan part of a 
particular state, and dummy variables for the number of bedrooms [Carrillo, Early, and Olsen, 
2010, Table A-1 (1)].  Table 1 reports the ratio of our payment standard for units with each 
number of bedrooms to our two-bedroom payment standard. 
6
The adjusted income used to determine a household’s subsidy is the household’s cash 
income from all sources plus an estimated return on home equity for homeowners minus allowed 
deductions from income, unless this yields a negative number.  In this case, adjusted income is 
zero.  Because homeowners are richer than renters with the same ordinary income, we add an 
estimated return on their home equity to their ordinary income to determine their gross incomes, 
as was done in HASE [Katagiri and Kingsley, 1980, 2.03(3)].  Appendix A describes how we 
calculated the estimated return for each homeowner.  Our allowed deductions from gross income 
mimic those in the HUD programs replaced at the time of our data to the extent possible with the 
Decennial Census’s PUMS data, namely, $480 a year per child, $400 a year if the head or co-
head of the household was elderly or disabled, and the mean of other deductions ($628 a year) 
based on HUD’s administrative data.  Unlike many welfare programs, the allowed deductions 
  Using these housing price indices and the nationally uniform 
bedroom adjustment factors, the payment standards for all numbers of bedrooms and all 
locations can be computed from the two-bedroom payment standard in any location. 
                                                 
5 See http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/fmr.html for the underlying data.  Because less than one percent of all 
households would be entitled to more than 4 bedrooms based on our algorithm, any reasonable treatment of units 
with more bedrooms would yield about the same results. 
6 It is a highly correlated (correlation coefficient=.983) with the more refined housing price index in Carrillo, Early, 
and Olsen (2010).   9 
from gross income in low-income housing programs are modest.  Their nominal amounts have 
not been changed for many years. 
 
3.  Methodology for Predicting Participation in Entitlement Programs 
 
The purposes of this paper are to estimate participation rates under alternative entitlement 
housing voucher programs and compare them with participation patterns in HUD’s current 
programs that they are intended to replace.  In order to estimate the number of households that 
would participate in a particular entitlement housing voucher program and its cost, it is necessary 
to predict the participation rate of households with each combination of observed characteristics.  
This section discusses the alternative methods that could have been used to make these 
predictions and describes the method chosen in more detail. 
There are two possible approaches to the prediction of participation rates under an 
entitlement housing voucher program.  One possibility is to use information on outcomes under 
the current non-entitlement system of housing assistance to estimate a model that could be used 
to simulate the effects of replacing this system with an entitlement housing voucher program.  
The other approach is to base predictions of participation rates under the proposed program on 
outcomes under a previous entitlement housing voucher program. 
Implementing the first approach would be very difficult.  It would involve specifying and 
estimating a model that explains the choices of a random sample of households under the current 
non-entitlement system of housing assistance.  This requires data on which households were 
offered housing assistance, how this offer affected the consumption bundles available to the 
household, and which households accepted the offer.  No survey of a random sample of the 
population collects information about which unassisted families were offered housing assistance.  
Without information on which families were offered housing assistance and what they were 
offered, it is not possible to describe accurately their budget spaces when they made their 
decisions.  Since the overwhelming majority of unassisted households are not offered housing 
assistance during a year, the best approximation of reality is to assume that no unassisted 
household was offered it.  This will lead to biased estimators of the parameters of the model.   
To avoid the preceding difficulties, we opted for the second approach.  We estimate the 
participation rates of households of various types in the five-percent household sample from the   10 
2000 Decennial Census using a previously estimated logit equation explaining participation in 
the Housing Assistance Supply Experiment.  This equation reported in Table 2 was estimated 
using data for 1977 because the participation rate seemed to have reached its steady state by 
then.  Because few single non-elderly households were eligible for housing assistance at the 
time, such households were excluded from the sample used to estimate the logit equation.  We 
exclude them from our analysis because we did not have a good basis for predicting their 
participation rates in the proposed entitlement programs.  Since HASE data were inadvertently 
discarded by an organization entrusted by HUD with its safekeeping, estimating alternative 
specifications of the prediction equations are not possible at this stage. 
How the logit equation is used to predict participation in an entitlement housing voucher 
in 1999 in other locations based on information in the PUMS requires some discussion.  We first 
created prediction equations based on the experience in each site by substituting the appropriate 
values for the dummy variable St. Joseph County (South Bend) into the equation.
7
Obviously, the generosity of the subsidy (the variable Allowance) is an important 
determinant of participation.  However, a subsidy of $3000 a year in South Bend in 1977 is 
considerably more generous than a subsidy of the same nominal magnitude in New York City in 
1999.  For each entitlement voucher program considered, we use Olsen, Davis, and Carrillo’s 
cross-sectional consumer price index to express each household’s subsidy in 1999 in terms of the 
prices that prevailed in each of HASE sites in 1999 and then use the national CPI to deflate these 
amounts to 1977, specifically, the CPI-U price index for all items. 
  Most of our 
predictions are based on the mean predicted participation rates across the two sites.  However, to 
test the sensitivity of the results to the prediction equation used, we also produce results based on 
the equations for the individual sites.  At the sample mean values of the variables, the predicted 
probability of participation is 10 percentage points lower in South Bend than Green Bay.  
Therefore, these prediction equations provide a substantial difference in predicted participation 
rates. 
The logit equation contains two variables Duration of Eligibility and Fraction Previous 
Year Eligible that are not available in the PUMS.  We substituted HASE sample mean values of 
these variables into the prediction equation.  The logit equation also contained a dummy variable 
                                                 
7 Because the estimated effects of the determinants of participation were very similar in the two sites in preliminary 
work, the authors settled on a final specification of the logit model in which only the constant term differed across 
sites [Carter and Wendt, 1982, p. 88].   11 
Previous Interview whose value we set equal to zero for the reason mentioned below.  Each year 
during HASE, the occupants of a random sample of dwelling units chosen at the outset of the 
experiment were surveyed.
8
In estimating the logit equation, the variable Minority was defined to be 0 if the 
household head was a non-Hispanic white and 1 otherwise.  It is tempting to apply this definition 
to households in the PUMS and use the logit equation in a straightforward manner to predict the 
participation rates of otherwise similar households in different racial and ethnic groups.
  The logit equation was estimated with data from this survey and 
administrative records from the fourth year of the experiment.  Due to household mobility and 
the addition of newly built units to the sample, some households surveyed in the fourth year were 
interviewed for the first time and many others had been interviewed earlier.  Each year’s survey 
asked a number of questions concerning the respondent’s knowledge about HASE, thereby 
increasing their awareness of the program.  The variable Previous Interview takes a value of 1 if 
the respondent had been interviewed previously and 0 otherwise.  Unsurprisingly, it was found 
that respondents who had been interviewed previously were more likely to be receiving a 
housing allowance.  Because no similar survey will accompany our reforms, we set the value of 
this variable equal to zero. 
9
Table 3 reports the percentage of the U.S. population in broad racial and ethnic groups in 
2000 and the percentages in HASE sites in 1980.  It documents the substantial difference in the 
racial composition of the two HASE sites that reflected a conscious choice in site selection.  
More importantly for present purposes, it reveals the very small Hispanic population in the two 
sites compared with their percentage of the U.S. population in 2000.  The households classified 
as minority in the sample underlying the logit equation were overwhelmingly black.  Very few 
were Hispanic. 
  
However, a careful consideration of the racial and ethnic mixes of the populations in HASE sites 
in 1977 and the participation rates of these groups in low-income housing programs in 1999 
argues strongly for a more nuanced approach. 
Clearly, HASE logit equations are most informative about the participation rates of non-
Hispanic whites and blacks, and we use them without modification for these groups.  Non-
Hispanic whites and blacks accounted for about 82 percent of HUD-assisted households in the 
                                                 
8 New units were added to the sample each year to account for new construction. 
9 In the previous draft of the paper, we succumbed to this temptation.  This led to extremely large predicted 
increases in Hispanic participation in low-income housing programs.   12 
lowest two real income deciles in 1999.
10
Our decisions about how to predict participation rates of households with other 
combinations of race and ethnicity are based on evidence on participation in HUD’s non-
entitlement housing voucher program in 1999 by households in the first real income decile.  
About two thirds of participants in the proposed programs are in this decile.  Because the 
existing program was a non-entitlement program that allocated funds to different localities in 
proportions that surely differed from the expenditure proportions under our entitlement 
programs, and the current program did not affect the consumption possibilities of households 
offered assistance in exactly the same way as any entitlement housing voucher program 
analyzed, the relative participation rates of different groups will not be exactly the same under 
the existing and proposed programs.  Nevertheless, we believe that the relative participation rates 
of different groups in the current voucher program provide useful guidance for predicting the 
participation rates of groups other than non-Hispanic whites and blacks.  In our view, this is 
undeniable for other-race Hispanics. 
  Since almost all households eligible for the 
entitlement housing programs are in these income deciles, the logit equation provides a good 
basis for predicting participation for the bulk of likely participants. 
Table 4 presents the total number of households of each type (excluding single non-
elderly households) in the first real income decile and their participation rates in HUD’s housing 
voucher program in 1999.  The participation rate of other-race non-Hispanics is similar to that of 
white non-Hispanics and very different from black non-Hispanics.  Therefore, we classify this 
group as non-minority for predicting their participation.  The participation rate of black 
Hispanics is very similar to that of black non-Hispanics.  We classify this group as minority for 
prediction purposes.  How to predict participation for white Hispanics is less clear.  Their 
participation rate in the current program is between the participation rates of non-Hispanic 
whites and blacks, albeit somewhat closer to the black rate.  Our predicted participation rate for 
members of this group is a weighted average of the participation rates of non-Hispanic whites 
and blacks with the same other characteristics, where the black participation rate has a weight of 
70 percent [.162=.3(.088)+.7(.194)]. 
                                                 
10 Our method for calculating real income is described later.  Briefly, it accounts for geographic differences in 
consumer prices and differences in family size and composition   13 
The most striking result in Table 4 is the extraordinarily low participation rate of other-
race Hispanics.  For example, it is only 2 percent of the participation rate of black Hispanics.  
This low participation rate is not limited to the voucher program.  Only 1 percent of all other-
race Hispanic households in the lowest real income decile received assistance from any of the 
HUD programs replaced compared to 19 percent for the group with the next lowest participation 
rate.  Without a doubt, other-race Hispanics are overwhelming American Indians whose 
immigration status precludes or strongly discourages applying for housing assistance.
11
Unlike the proposed entitlement programs, HASE did not replace the low-income 
housing programs that existed at the time.  Instead it offered an alternative form of housing 
assistance to all households with sufficiently low income, roughly the poorest 15 to 20 percent of 
households.  Most families served by existing programs were eligible for HASE, but few 
switched to the allowance program [Lowry, 1983, p. 89].
  
Categorizing other-race Hispanics as minorities in the logit equation for predicting their 
participation in an entitlement housing voucher program with current citizenship rules for 
eligibility would grossly overstate their participation.  Based on the numbers in Table 4, we 
assume that the participation rate of other-race Hispanics in an entitlement housing voucher 
program would be only 2.5 percent of the participation rate of otherwise similar white Hispanics 
[.025=.004/.162].   
12
                                                 
11 See HUD (2001, Chapter 5) for the citizenship rules that apply to all HUD housing assistance. 
  The logit equation was estimated 
with data on HASE-eligible households who were not served by other programs.  Therefore, it 
surely understates what the participation rates would have been in the absence of the existing 
programs.  Many households that continued to participate in the existing programs would have 
participated in the entitlement housing assistance program if the existing programs had been 
terminated.  We assume that all households that were poor enough to be eligible for HASE but 
continued to participate in an existing program would have participated in HASE in the absence 
of the existing programs.  Lowry (1983, pp. 96-99) provides results that allow us to predict 
participation in an entitlement housing voucher program in the absence of the existing programs 
under this assumption.  Specifically, he reports the fraction of eligible households (excluding 
those served by other housing programs) who received housing allowances and the fraction of all 
eligible households who received housing allowances or were served by other programs, 
12 Since housing allowance payments were limited to at most the ten years of the experiment, this is not surprising.     14 
separately for renters and owners in each site.  Consistent with these results, we increase the 
predicted participation rates based on the logit regression by 17.8 percent for renters and 32.1 
percent for homeowners in Green Bay and 44.7 percent for renters and 14.8 percent for 




4.  Estimating Participation Rates in Existing Housing Programs 
 
The number of households of various types who received assistance from the HUD programs 
that would be gradually replaced by the entitlement housing voucher program is based primarily 
on HUD’s Longitudinal Occupancy, Demography, and Income (LODI) file that contains data 
from HUD’s Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System (MTCS) and Tenant Rental Assistance 
Certification System (TRACS) for 1995 through 2002.  This database provides information that 
is reported by local housing authorities and owners of privately-owned HUD-subsidized housing 
projects on the characteristics of assisted families collected when they are admitted to a housing 
program or recertified for continued participation.  It also identifies the primary program 
providing the housing assistance.
14  Due to incomplete reporting by housing agencies and owners 
of private projects, the LODI data file does not contain information on all households that 
received HUD assistance under the set of programs considered.  Furthermore, in making 
calculations, we deleted observations for households that did not report values of the variables 
used in the analysis or reported clearly erroneous values.
15
We used data on the total number of households that received assistance under the 
specified programs in 1998 and 2000 reported in HUD’s Picture of Subsidized Households 
(PSH) to adjust upward the total number of households of each type in the LODI data file in 
1999 with reasonable values of the variables used in the analysis.
  So using unadjusted counts of the 
households in the LODI data file with reasonable values of the variables of interest would 
understate the number of HUD-assisted households. 
16
                                                 
13 These are percentages rather than percentage points.  The same percentage is applied to the predicted participation 
rate for all renters in Green Bay no matter what their other characteristics and similarly for the other three groups. 
  Specifically, with two 
exceptions explained below, we calculated the number of HUD-assisted households in each state 
14 Selected researchers were granted access to this file under confidentiality agreements to protect the privacy of the 
households involved.  An issue of Cityscape (Volume 8, Number 2, 2005) contains many articles based on it. 
15 With billions of entries, some errors are inevitable. 
16 The source is http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/assthsg.html.  HUD did not produce a PSH for 1999.   15 
in 1999 by first multiplying the number of HUD units (or vouchers) in each state by the 
occupancy rate (or voucher utilization rate) and then calculating the mean of these numbers for 
the two years.  The ratio of this estimated total number of HUD-assisted households in the state 
to the number of households in the LODI file was used to adjust the participation totals for all 
household types in the state. 
One problem with the PSH numbers is that they understate the number of units and 
households served in 2000 due to the exclusion of households served by Indian Housing 
Agencies (IHA).  After 1998, IHA were no longer required to submit to HUD the information 
used to construct the PSH.
17
Although the total number of households served by IHA is a very small fraction of the 
national HUD total, their exclusion would greatly affect the results in the states with the largest 
Native American populations.  In Alaska, IHA accounted for almost half of total HUD units; in 
South Dakota about a third.  Since the proposed reforms would require congressional approval 
and members represent states or parts of states, producing credible results at the state level is 
important. 
  Since the money spent to serve these households is included in the 
taxpayer cost of the existing system and residents of these areas would be eligible for the 
entitlement housing voucher program, households served by IHA should be included among 
current recipients.  The 1998 PSH reports the number of units and occupancy rates for IHA in 
each state, and we use this information to calculate the number of households served in that year.  
To estimate the number of households served by these housing authorities in 2000 in each state, 
we multiply the 1998 number of units by the mean of the 1998 and 2000 public housing 
occupancy rates in the state. 
With this adjustment to the PSH numbers, our estimate of the HUD total in each state in 
1999 was the mean of the 1998 and 2000 totals with one exception.  Even if the 1998 and 2000 
totals were correct, this estimate will be too high in some states and too low in others due to 
linear interpolation.  Furthermore, there are always some inaccuracies in any data file.  We can 
deal with these measurement errors to some extent.  Under the assumption that housing 
authorities do not submit forms for fictional households, the number of households served in 
each state in 1999 must be at least as large as the number in the 1999 LODI file.  In seven states, 
the estimated HUD total was less than the number of households in the 1999 LODI.  In these 
                                                 
17 See http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/ih/codetalk/nahasda/1998/1998-09.pdf.   16 
cases, we increased our estimate of the HUD total to the LODI total.  This added only about 
20,000 households to the total. 
Independent evidence indicates that our methods led to estimates of the total number of 
HUD-assisted households at the national level in 1999 very close to the truth.  Our estimate is 
about 4.15 million.  HUD’s Recent Research Results (October 2000) reported 4.19 million 
households at the end of 1999, excluding Indian housing but including HUD-assisted housing in 
U.S. possessions.
18
Overall, the preceding analysis led us to conclude that the LODI file contained about 87 
percent of HUD-assisted households, and we adjusted total participation in current programs 
upward by that magnitude.  However, we did not adjust participation rates upwards by the same 
percentage for families of all types.  We used the same percentage adjustment for all families in 
the same state, but families of a given type accounted for different fractions of the population in 
different states. 
  Since there were about 70,000 households served by IHA and 110,000 
HUD-assisted households in U.S. possessions, the comparable HUD number is also about 4.15 
million.  This does not preclude errors in a particular direction for some types of households, but 
it implies errors of equal magnitude in the opposite direction for other types. 
 
5.  Taxpayer Cost of Existing Housing Programs 
 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate certain effects of replacing the bulk of HUD’s low-
income housing programs for most potential recipients in the United States with alternative 
entitlement housing voucher programs with the same taxpayer cost as the current system and 
with taxpayer costs 10 percent more and less than this amount.  This section describes how we 
estimated the cost of serving all households except single non-elderly under the HUD programs 
replaced.
19
The HUD programs that would be replaced with the entitlement voucher program served 
about 4.0 million households in 1999.  The full taxpayer cost of serving these households is not 
  For the reasons mentioned below, ours is a conservative estimate of taxpayer cost.  
As a result, our estimate of the increase in the number of households served that would result 
from the reform is understated on this account. 
                                                 
18 See http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/rrr/rrr_10_2000/1000_6.html.  
19 Recall that we exclude single non-elderly individuals from our analysis because we did not have a good basis for 
predicting their participation rates in the proposed entitlement programs.   17 
available.  To get a lower bound estimate of this cost, we begin with the reported outlays of the 
HUD programs that served them.  According to the U.S. House of Representatives (2000, Table 
15-32), this amount was about $25 billion.  However, a part of it was used to serve non-elderly 
one-person households that are excluded from the analysis.  In adjusting the total taxpayer cost 
for the exclusion of these households, we account for their share of total assisted households 
(about 20 percent) and the ratio of their cost per household to the cost per household of other 
household types.  In the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, the latter ratio is about 
.77.
20  Since we have not found data for other programs, we assume that this ratio applies to all 
current HUD programs.  This leads to the conclusions that the excluded households account for 
16.7 percent of the aforementioned budget and hence about $20.8 billion is spent on the 
households included in the analysis.  This figure includes almost $500 million spent to assist 
households in U.S. possessions, mainly Puerto Rico.
21
The taxpayer cost of providing housing assistance to the specified households is clearly 
much greater than this amount.  For example, about 40 percent of the households that live in tax 
credit projects receive tenant-based or project-based Section 8 assistance [GAO, 1997, p. 40].  
HUD assistance under these programs is included in our total.  However, the tax credit subsidy 
that pays 70 percent of the development cost is not included.  Furthermore, tax credit projects 
usually receive additional subsidies from several other sources that are not included in the 
outlays of the specified HUD programs.  For example, many receive subsidies funded by the 
HOME Program that provides housing block grants to state and local governments [Cummings 
and DiPasquale, 1999, p. 299].  Public housing provides another example.  Housing authorities 
receive substantial property tax abatements on their projects.  This is a cost to local taxpayers.  A 
less obvious example is the opportunity cost of continuing to use public housing projects to serve 
assisted households.  These projects could be sold to the highest bidders and the proceeds put 
into a trust fund whose interest is used to fund housing vouchers.  Since some of these funds 
  Assuming that 16.7 percent is devoted to 
single non-elderly, about $400 million is devoted to other households.  This suggests that the 
total taxpayer cost of the programs replaced in the United States for serving all households 
except the single non-elderly was about $20.4 billion. 
                                                 
20 The source of these numbers is the LODI file. 
21 This is based on data from the 1998 and 2000 PSH.   18 
would be difficult to tap to support an entitlement housing voucher program, we ignore these 
costs and limit our budget for most proposed entitlement programs to $20.4 billion. 
Because the entitlement voucher programs would have administrative costs, the entire 
$20.4 billion would not be available to distribute to recipients.  We assume that the 
administrative cost of the entitlement programs would account for the same fraction of the total 
cost as in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, namely, 8.2 percent.
22
 
  This leaves 
$18.8 billion to distribute to recipients.  All of our simulations involving equal taxpayer cost 
distribute slightly less than this amount.  HASE administered their entitlement program in a 
simpler manner than the current voucher program.  If these procedures were used, it would be 
possible to distribute more to recipients with no increase in the budget. 
6.  Results 
 
This section presents estimates of the effect on participation rates of families of various types of 
replacing HUD’s largest current low-income housing with alternative tenure-neutral entitlement 
housing voucher programs.  Most simulations are designed to have the same taxpayer cost as the 
current system, but one is designed to spend 10 percent more and another 10 percent less.  Most 
simulations adjust the payment standards for differences in the number of bedrooms to which the 
family is entitled in a manner consistent with the national average in HUD’s Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher Program, but one uses adjustments based on a hedonic regression.  Most predict 
participation in the entitlement program as the mean of the predicted probabilities from the two 
HASE sites for families of each type.  However, to test the sensitivity of the results to the 
prediction equation used, we calculate separate results based on the prediction equations for each 
site.  We report results for families whose members are in the first and second decile of the 
distribution of real income.  This requires a measure of the real income of the members of a 
household.  In all simulations, we add an imputed return on home equity to the income of 
homeowners and account for geographical price differences in calculating real household 
income.  To measure the level of material well-being attained by the individuals in the household 
in most simulations, we divide real household income by an equivalence scale for family size 
                                                 
22 In fiscal year 2005, HUD spent $13.5 billion on housing assistance payments and $1.2 billion on program 
administration (http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2115).   19 
and composition recommended by a committee of the National Research Council, namely, the 
number of adults plus .7 times the number of children all raised to the .7 power, [Citro and 
Michael, 1995, p. 162].  In one simulation, we use the simpler real household per capita income. 
Table 5 reports results based on the current budget for the programs replaced, payment 
standard adjustments for the number of bedrooms in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher 
Program, the mean of the predicted probabilities from the two HASE sites, and the NRC 
equivalence scale for family size and composition.  It indicates that the entitlement housing 
voucher program would serve more than 2 million additional households with a slightly smaller 
budget, namely, $20.0 rather than $20.4 billion.  All major groups would experience large 
increases in participation from the reform ranging from 16 percent for black households to 155 
percent for households with 5 or more members. 
In interpreting the results in this table, it is important to distinguish between the amount 
of money spent on behalf of a recipient and how much the recipient is helped.  Because the same 
total amount is spent on a larger number of households, the amount spent per household is less 
under the entitlement housing voucher program than with the continuation of the current system.  
Current recipients will not be hurt by the reforms because they will be grandfathered.  However, 
many future recipients will receive smaller subsidies than they would have received with the 
continuation of the current system.  This does not mean that they will be served less well.  The 
best previous studies show that housing vouchers could be used to provide occupants of 
subsidized housing projects with equally good housing for the same rent at a much lower 
taxpayer cost [Mayo et al. (1980); Wallace et al., 1981].  More recent studies yield the same 
conclusion, albeit based on data of lower quality.  The amount spent on behalf of recipients 
under different types of low-income housing assistance is a poor measure of how much they are 
helped by it.  The 61 percent increase in the number of households served due to the reform 
analyzed in Table 5 results to a considerable extent from replacing programs of project-based 
assistance with much more cost-effective housing vouchers.  However, it is the case that 
households that would have received Section 8 vouchers with a continuation of the current 
system would not only receive smaller subsidies but also be less well served by the entitlement 
housing voucher program.  The entitlement program’s payment standards were less than HUD’s 
FMRs in almost all cases.  The median and mean payment standards for two-bedroom units 
across all metropolitan areas were about 16 percent less than the median and mean FMRs.  In our   20 
view, this reduction in subsidies to future recipients serves the interest of equity.  Instead of 
providing larger subsidies to two identical households and none to a third, the proposed reform 
provides smaller subsidies to all three. 
Table 6 shows that the wide range of percentage increases for different groups is due to 
the overrepresentation of some groups and underrepresentation of others in the current system.  It 
reports participation rates in the current system and under the entitlement voucher program 
separately for households in the first and second real income deciles.  About 93 percent of 
current recipients and 98 percent of participants in the entitlement voucher are in these real 
income deciles.  Under the current system, the participation rate of blacks in the first income 
decile is more than twice the participation rate of whites or Hispanics.  Under the entitlement 
voucher program, the black participation rate is only slightly greater than the white rate.
23
Since the proposed reforms would require congressional approval and members represent 
states or parts of states, we report the overall results for each state.  Table 7 indicates very large 
increases in the overwhelming majority of states.  In five states, more than twice as many 
households would be served.  Only five states would experience decreases in the number of 
assisted households.  These range from 0.2 percent in Connecticut to 11 percent in North Dakota.  
These are small states that had unusually high participation rates under the current system 
ranging from 23.9 percent in the bottom two real income deciles in South Dakota to 44.9 percent 
in D.C.  Throughout the country, only 17.8 percent of all households in these deciles participated 
in the current programs. 
  
Because blacks in the lowest real income decile participate at such a high rate in the current 
system, they would experience a smaller increase in participation than other groups due to the 
reform (about 13 percent).  The pattern is similar in the second real income decile.  The data in 
Table 6 support the conventional wisdom that current low-income housing programs serve large 
families at a much lower rate than smaller families.  Large families would be served at a much 
higher rate under the entitlement voucher program and hence experience the greatest percentage 
increase in participation from the reform. 
Although passage of legislation to implement reforms does not require unanimous 
consent, it would surely be facilitated by insuring that no state experiences a reduction in the 
                                                 
23 The Hispanic participation rate is much lower than the rates for blacks and whites due to the very low predicted 
participation rates of other-race Hispanics due to their immigration status.   21 
number of households that receive housing assistance.  Because the states involved have such 
small populations, this can be done at a minute cost by providing higher subsidies to the 
households in these states than would result from the strict application of the formulas 
underlying the proposed entitlement housing voucher program.  This is a common legislative 
practice.  One particularly relevant example is the legislation that allows selected housing 
authorities to base their payment standards in HUD’s Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher 
Program on Fair Market Rents that are 25 percent greater than the norm.  This enables them to 
provide more generous subsidies to the residents of their areas at the expense of taxpayers 
elsewhere.  Allowing housing authorities in the five states that would experience declines in the 
number of assisted households under the standard formulas of the proposed reform to offer 
sufficiently generous subsidies so that the number of assisted households in each state would 
increase by 5 percent would cost less than $76 million each year.  This would increase the cost of 
the proposed reform to $20.1 billion which is still less than the cost of the current system. 
Table 8 reports results for alternative policy parameters, participation prediction 
equations, taxpayer cost, and measures of real income.  Column 1 repeats the results for the 
simulation reported in Table 5.  The results of each alternative simulation are compared with 
them. 
The results in column 2 are based on the same assumptions as those in column 1 except 
for the measure of real income.  In column 2, the real income enjoyed by members of a 
household is simply real household income accounting for geographic price differences and the 
return on home equity for homeowners divided by the number of members of the household.  
This alternative definition of real income only affects the estimated percentage increase for 
households in different real income deciles.  Although alternative definitions of real income lead 
to different quantitative conclusions about the increases in the two lowest deciles, the qualitative 
effects are the same.  Households in both deciles would experience large increases in 
participation due to the reforms. 
The results of an entitlement housing voucher program depend on its parameters.  For 
example, the participation rate of larger households relative to smaller households can be 
increased without spending more money by increasing the payment standards associated with 
units with many bedrooms and reducing it for units with few bedrooms.  Column 3 reports the 
results of an alternative variation in program parameters, namely, 10 percent higher payment   22 
standards for households with an elderly or disabled household head.  Some argue an increment 
is desirable to pay for additional features that are important for these households.  This 
modification of program parameters has some effect on the participation rates of all groups, but 
its largest effects are to increase the participation rates of the elderly, small households, and 
households in the second real income decile. 
Column 4 reports results for an alternative set of payment standards.  Specifically, 
payment standards for units with different numbers of bedrooms are based on a hedonic 
regression rather than HUD’s Fair Market Rents (see table 1).  These lead to differences in the 
payment standards and hence subsidies for households of different sizes and compositions.  For 
most groups, the effect is modest.  Although the smallest households gain the most from these 
alternative payment standards, their percentage gain in participation from replacing current 
programs with an entitlement voucher program is still much smaller than for larger households. 
Some favor greater spending on low-income housing assistance; others favor less 
spending for this purpose.  Columns 5 and 6 report the results of spending about 10 percent more 
and 10 percent less than the current system, respectively.  The most important result is that the 
proposed reform would serve 50 percent more households in total and substantially more 
households of every type while spending 10 percent less money. 
The preceding estimates of the effects of proposed reforms are based on the average 
participation experience in the two HASE sites.  The actual effects will surely be at least 
somewhat different because the actual participation rates of households with a particular set of 
characteristics and offered a particular subsidy will differ from the average HASE experience.  
The remaining columns in Table 8 indicate the sensitivity of our results to the equation used to 
predict participation.  As mentioned earlier, the two HASE sites differed greatly in their vacancy 
rates and racial composition and experienced very different participation rates in the entitlement 
program for households with the same characteristics.  At the sample mean values of the 
variables, the predicted probability of participation based on the logit equation is 10 percentage 
points lower in South Bend than Green Bay.  Therefore, these prediction equations provide a 
substantial difference in predicted participation rates. 
Column 7 presents results based on the South Bend experience and column 8 on the 
Green Bay experience, adjusting the program’s payment standards in each case to spend the 
current budget.  The lower predicted participation rates based on the South Bend experience lead   23 
to smaller predicted increases in participation than in column 1, but the overall increase exceeds 
50 percent and all groups experience substantial increases.  The predicted increase in 
participation from the reform is much larger for all groups based on the Green Bay prediction 
equation.  However, the qualitative conclusions are the same for the alternative prediction 
equations. 
The preceding analysis indicates how the effect of replacing the current system with an 
entitlement housing voucher depends on the participation propensities, when the program’s 
payment standards are adjusted to spend the current budget.  The final simulations consider how 
the outcomes of an entitlement voucher program with fixed parameters would vary with 
differences in participation propensities.  Column 9 reports the outcomes for an entitlement 
program with the payment standards underlying the results in column 1 if the actual participation 
experience was that in South Bend.  The result would be smaller, but still substantial, increases 
for all groups and spending $1.5 billion less.  Column 10 reports the outcomes for the same 
voucher program based on the Green Bay participation experience.  In this case, the increases 
would be larger for all groups and the cost would be $1.6 billion more.   
It is rarely, if ever, possible to predict exactly the cost of changes in government policy, 
and the inability to do it in this case is a very weak argument against the proposed reform 
because it will be phased in over about a decade.  If participation experience deviates from the 
expected in the early years, the payment standards can be adjusted to account for these 
deviations.  Some adjustments in payment standards will occur every year to account for 
inflation.  In the early years of the reform, this could be done each year rather than by formula.  
If participation rates and hence taxpayer cost are higher than expected, these adjustments could 
be more modest.  If they are lower than expected, the adjustments could be more generous. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The calculations in this paper strongly suggest that it will be possible to devise an entitlement 
housing voucher program that costs no more than the current system and that serves many more 
households of each type.  Indeed, an entitlement voucher program that costs much less than the 
current system would have this effect.  With due attention to the transition to the new system, 
this can be done without hurting current recipients.  Indeed, a transition can be designed to   24 
benefit many of these households.  Our conclusion is that replacing the current system with an 
entitlement housing allowance program serves the interests of low-income households and the 
taxpayers who want to help them with their housing.  Sometimes it is possible to get more for 
less.   25 
Appendix A 
 
This appendix describes how we calculated the return on home equity of each homeowner in the 
2000 Decennial Census PUMS.  Home equity is equal to the market value of the house minus the 
outstanding balance on all home loans.  The PUMS reports the owner’s estimate of market value 
but does not report the outstanding balance on home loans.  We combine information from the 
PUMS, the American Housing Survey, Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey, and 
research on the relationship between the owner’s estimate of market value and actual sales price 
to approximate each household’s home equity and the return on it. 
PUMS reports the owner’s estimate of market value (VALUE) in 24 categories.  We use 
the midpoint of the category reported by a household as its estimate of the market value of its 
house.  Based on research on the relationship between the owner’s estimate of market value and 
actual sales price [Kiel and Zabel, 1999], we multiply the owner’s estimate by .95 to get a better 
estimate of market value.   
PUMS does not report outstanding balances on mortgage and home equity loans.  
However, it does report monthly payments on first and second mortgages (MRT1AMT and 
MRT2AMT) and the year that the household occupied the unit (YRMOVED).  To approximate 
the outstanding balance, we assumed that (1) the owner’s only loans are first and second 
mortgages taken out at the time that the household moved into its house, (2) the loans have not 
been refinanced, (3) both loans are for some standard duration, and (4) the interest rate on these 
loans is the national average interest rate for loans of similar durations at the time that the 
mortgage was originated.  Under these assumptions, the appropriate formula to calculate 
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In this formula, OB is the outstanding balance on the loan, MP is the monthly payment 
(MRT1AMT or MRT2AMT), T is the number of remaining monthly payments, and r is the 
monthly interest rate.  Adding the estimated outstanding balances on the first and second 
mortgages yields the overall outstanding balance.     26 
To approximate the outstanding balance on a mortgage based on the preceding formula 
requires estimates of its interest rate r and number of remaining mortgage payments T.  The 
PUMS reports neither.  To estimate the interest rate on first and second mortgages, we combine 
data on the average durations of mortgages of each type with data on mortgage interest rates for 
mortgages of similar durations.  Specifically, the 1999 National American Housing Survey 
reports that the mean term of first mortgages was 25 years (300 months) and the mean term of 
second mortgages was 17 years (204 months).  We assume that all first and second mortgages 
were of these durations.  To approximate the interest rates on them, we use the interest rates at 
the time that the household moved into its house from Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market 
Survey for 30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgages and Conventional Conforming 15-Year Fixed Rate 
Mortgages.
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Due to the various approximations involved in our calculations, the predicted number of 
remaining mortgage payments was negative in some cases.  In these cases, we assumed that the 
outstanding balance on the mortgage was zero.  In part for the same reason, the estimated 
outstanding balance on all mortgages exceeded the estimate market value of the house in some 
cases.  In these cases, we assumed that home equity was zero. 
  The PUMS does not report the exact date that the household moved into its house.  
Instead, it reports the date in one of six categories: 1999-2000, 1995-1998, 1990-1994, 1980-
1989, 1970-1978, and 1969 or earlier.  We assume that the move occurred in the middle of each 
period except for the last.  We assume that households in the last category moved into their 
house in January 1969.  Very few people in this category had a mortgage.  The first period was 
assumed to end on April 1, 2000, the approximate time of the census survey.    Our calculations 
use the interest rates on 30-year and 15-year mortgages at these times for first and second 
mortgages, respectively.  The PUMS data together with the preceding assumptions about when 
mortgages were originated leads to an estimate of the number of mortgage payments that had 
already been made.  This combined with our assumption about the duration of first and second 
mortgages leads to an estimate of number of remaining mortgage payments. 
Finally, we must apply a rate of return to home equity to get a dollar return that is added 
to the homeowner’s income.  Such returns differ from property to property and time to time.  For 
our calculations, we assume a rate of return of 7.2 percent.  This was the average mortgage 
                                                 
24 The sources are http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm and 
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/docs/15yr_pmmsmnth.xls    27 
interest rate on 30-year fixed rate mortgages between 1998 and 2002.  The assumed rate of return 
overstates the average return on home equity for at least one important reason and understates it 
for another.  Since the return on home equity is untaxed, the relevant rate of return is the 
expected after-tax return on a taxed investment of the same risk.  Recipients of mortgage interest 
payments must pay taxes on this income.  Therefore, the after-tax return on mortgages was less 
than 7.2 percent during this period.  An offsetting bias is that mortgagors assume more risk than 
mortgagees.  Mortgagees do not incur losses unless the market value of the house falls below the 
outstanding balance of the loan.  Index funds based on the S&P 500 and the Wilshire 4500 
arguably are more risky than mortgages but less risky than equity in a house.  The returns on 
both indices vary greatly from year to year.  Between 1996 and 2005, the return on the S&P 
index fund varied from a high of 33.17 percent in 1997 to a low of negative 22.05 percent in 
2002.  In 2000, the rates of return on these index funds were –9.14 and –9.74 percent, 
respectively.  The before-tax rate of return on the stocks in the S&P 500 averaged about 9.01 
percent over this period and the rate of return on the stocks in the Wilshire 4500 averaged about 
9.75 percent.  After-tax returns would be around 6 percent.  The risk associated with the equity in 
a single asset is surely greater than the risk associated with an index fund of stocks.     28 
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Ratios of Payment Standard for Units with Each Number of Bedrooms
to Two-Bedroom Payment StandardVariable Coefficient t-statistic Sample Mean
Constant -3.281 3.70 1.00
Allowance
* 0.396 3.31 6.64
Duration of eligibility (yrs) 0.036 5.18 10.56
Fraction previous year eligible
+ 1.143 3.01 -0.26
Household size -0.206 3.27 2.71
Household type
   Children in household 1.359 3.68 0.56
   Single parent -0.388 1.70 0.34
   Elderly 0.089 0.24 0.36
   Elderly couple -0.196 0.70 0.10
Owner 0.067 0.35 0.19
Minority 0.164 0.65 0.11
St. Joseph County -0.456 2.88 0.47
non-elderly parent with children is .987 (=1.359-.388).
Table 2 
Logit Equation for the Probability of Participation in Proposed Program
Source: Carter & Wendt, 1982, p. 57.
Notes: -- * Natural logarithm of annual dollars, + Natural logarithm
Household types listed are not mutually exclusive.  For example, the coefficient for 
a non-elderly married couple with children is 1.359, but the coefficient for a singleGroup United States (2000) St. Joseph (1980) Brown (1980)
White 75.1 89.4 97.7
Black 12.3 8.9 0.3
Other 12.6 1.7 2.0
Non-Hispanic 87.5 98.5 99.5
Hispanic 12.5 1.5 0.5
Table 3
Racial and Ethnic Percentages
Sources: For the U.S. in 2000, http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html.
For the HASE sites in 1980, www.socialexplorer.com.Group Voucher Participation Rate
Non-Hispanic
     White 3,852,013 0.088
     Black 2,111,053 0.194
     Other 513,820 0.074
Hispanic
     White 877,012 0.162
     Black 60,868 0.206
     Other 844,677 0.004
Excluding Single Non-Elderly
Participation Rates in First Real Income Decile in Existing Housing Voucher Program (1999)
Table 4
Total HouseholdsGroup Current Proposed Absolute Percentage
System Program Increase Increase
All 3,339,409 5,366,820 2,027,411 61%
White 1,846,794 3,447,158 1,600,364 87%
Black 1,360,794 1,582,365 221,571 16%
Hispanic 461,222 702,132 240,910 52%
Elderly 1,202,217 1,440,998 238,781 20%
Non-Elderly 2,137,192 3,925,822 1,788,630 84%
Metro 2,728,184 4,304,864 1,576,680 58%
Non-Metro 611,225 1,061,956 450,731 74%
First Real Income Decile 2,239,993 3,628,556 1,388,563 62%
Second Real Income Decile 852,240 1,622,123 769,883 90%
1-2 person 1888015 2419067 531,052 28%
3-4 person 1102278 2058900 956,622 87%
5+ person 349116 888853 539,737 155%
Number of Households
Table 5








1-2 person 30.3% 40.4%
3-4 person 29.0% 50.3%








1-2 person 15.0% 21.9%
3-4 person 6.2% 16.7%
5+ person 1.9% 10.2%
Table 6
Subgroup Participation Rates in Lowest Two Real Income Deciles for Current System and PS1 Reform
First Decile of Real Income
Second Decile of Real IncomeState Current Proposed Absolute Percentage
Name Programs Program Increase Increase
AL 66,681 99,594 32,913                     49.4%
AK 8,521 11,589 3,068                       36.0%
AZ 38,019 87,469 49,450                     130.1%
AR 38,777 51,305 12,528                     32.3%
CA 330,172 675,662 345,490                   104.6%
CO 36,499 59,255 22,756                     62.3%
CT 59,401 59,254 (148)                         -0.2%
DE 8,442 12,789 4,347                       51.5%
DC 22,467 20,856 (1,611)                      -7.2%
FL 134,595 360,719 226,124                   168.0%
GA 97,760 171,912 74,152                     75.9%
HI 15,982 24,053 8,071                       50.5%
ID 8,948 30,294 21,345                     238.5%
IL 138,683 211,836 73,153                     52.7%
IN 66,508 87,764 21,256                     32.0%
IA 28,051 34,674 6,623                       23.6%
KS 22,904 32,216 9,312                       40.7%
KY 61,064 90,095 29,031                     47.5%
LA 61,424 113,579 52,156                     84.9%
ME 17,597 26,968 9,371                       53.3%
MD 67,795 88,959 21,163                     31.2%
MA 112,294 140,179 27,885                     24.8%
MI 100,341 159,772 59,431                     59.2%
MN 59,219 63,484 4,266                       7.2%
MS 39,887 70,450 30,563                     76.6%
MO 65,553 81,024 15,471                     23.6%
MT 12,927 17,359 4,431                       34.3%
NE 19,618 21,527 1,910                       9.7%
NV 14,480 33,612 19,132                     132.1%
NH 14,289 18,972 4,683                       32.8%
NJ 120,955 166,206 45,251                     37.4%
NM 19,802 32,604 12,802                     64.6%
NY 392,438 541,349 148,911                   37.9%
NC 85,823 144,541 58,718                     68.4%
ND 10,343 9,201 (1,143)                      -11.0%
OH 143,893 187,284 43,391                     30.2%
OK 44,128 66,539 22,410                     50.8%
OR 30,374 57,826 27,452                     90.4%
PA 148,884 230,115 81,231                     54.6%
RI 25,764 24,006 (1,757)                      -6.8%
SC 44,136 84,144 40,008                     90.6%
SD 12,448 12,246 (203)                         -1.6%
TN 74,119 109,693 35,575                     48.0%
TX 193,108 382,605 189,497                   98.1%
UT 11,036 25,623 14,587                     132.2%
VT 7,541 12,737 5,195                       68.9%
VA 74,473 110,899 36,426                     48.9%
WA 48,054 95,465 47,411                     98.7%
WV 23,935 44,119 20,184                     84.3%
WI 54,878 66,413 11,536                     21.0%
WY 4,378 5,983 1,605                       36.7%
US 3,339,409 5,366,820 2,027,411                60.7%
Effects of Proposed PS1 Reform on Number of Households Served by State
Table 7Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
All 61% 61% 63% 63% 72% 50% 53% 69% 45% 76%
White 87% 87% 90% 91% 101% 73% 77% 97% 66% 107%
Black 16% 16% 17% 17% 22% 10% 12% 21% 8% 25%
Hispanic 52% 52% 52% 51% 62% 43% 48% 57% 41% 64%
Elderly 20% 20% 32% 23% 29% 11% 10% 29% 4% 36%
Non-Elderly 84% 84% 80% 86% 96% 73% 78% 91% 68% 99%
Metro 58% 58% 59% 60% 68% 48% 51% 65% 43% 72%
Non-Metro 74% 74% 77% 78% 86% 62% 62% 85% 53% 95%
First Decile 62% 65% 62% 63% 65% 59% 51% 73% 48% 76%
Second Decile 90% 41% 92% 97% 117% 64% 87% 94% 67% 114%
1-2 person 28% 28% 34% 35% 37% 20% 20% 36% 14% 42%
3-4 person 87% 87% 84% 89% 99% 75% 81% 93% 72% 102%
5+ person 155% 155% 151% 135% 172% 138% 142% 168% 129% 180%
Cost (in billions) $20.0 $20.0 $20.3 $20.1 $22.2 $18.2 $20.1 $20.2 $18.5 $21.6
5. Same as 1 except 10 percent larger taxpayer cost
Policy and Prediction Scenarios
Percentage Increases in Households Served under Alternative Policy and Prediction Scenarios
Table 8
4. Same as 1 except for hedonic bedroom adjustments
Policy and Prediction Scenarios (see text for details)
1. FMR bedroom adjustments, current budget, mean prediction equations, ES real income measure
2. Same as 1 except for use of per capita real income measure
3. Same as 1 except payment standards are 10 percent higher for elderly or disabled household
The cost of the current system for the programs and households involved is at least $20.4 billion.
6. Same as 1 except 10 percent smaller taxpayer cost
7. Same as 1 except South Bend equation used to predict participation
8. Same as 1 except Green Bay equation used to predict participation
9. Same program parameters as 1 but taxpayer cost based on South Bend participation equation
10. Same program parameters as 1 but taxpayer cost based on Green Bay participation equation